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Abstract

This thesis will examine Vladimir Putin's controversial political decisions regarding
the Second Chechen War justifying the conflict both inside and outside of Russia. It opens with
Putin identifying with the United States after the terrorist activities of September 11, 2001 and
how he used the American War on Terror to explain his own decisions regarding the Caucasus.
For further understanding the paper looks at the history of Russian-Chechen relations to show
how the centuries of hostility and mistrust culminated in two Chechen Wars within a ten year
time period (1994-2004). It will also study the Russian view, held by Putin, which Chechnya
was not declaring independence but was attempting to secede from the Russian Federation. It
concludes with a look at Putin's solution to the conflict, the Chechnization of the Second
Chechen War, where the Russian military withdrew from the region to be replaced by Putin's
handpicked regime, the Kadyrovs.

Russia, Chechnya, Putin, Kadyrov, Nord Ost, Beslan
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A Necessary Monster?
Vladimir Putin's Political Decisions Regarding the "Secession" of Chechnya and the Second
Chechen War (1999-2009)

Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, while rescue
workers were still searching for the missing and dust from the fallen buildings still floated in the
air, President George W. Bush took the first call from an international leader since the attacks.
On the other end of the line was Russian President Vladimir Putin.1 Putin called to express his
condolences and sent a telegram expressing “anger and indignation.” Later that day in a
televised address he stated that the attacks, “were not a localized American drama but an event
that ‘goes beyond national borders,’”2 and “Russia knows directly what terrorism means…and
because of this we, more than anyone, understand the feelings of the American people. In the
name of Russia, I want to say to the American people -- we are with you."3 In identifying with
the American people in their fight against terrorism, Putin was referring to the recent terrorist

1

Jill Dougherty, “9/11: A Turning Point for Putin,” CNN World, September 10, 2002, http://articles.cnn.com/200209-10/world/ar911.russia.putin_1_russian-president-vladimir-putin-dmitri-trenin-moscow-carnegiecenter?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed March 4, 2012)
2
John O’Laoghlin, Gearoid O Tuathail, and Vladimir Kolossov, “A Risky Western Turn, Putin’s 9-11 Script and
Ordinary Russians,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, no. 1 (January, 2004): 3-34.
3
Dougherty, “9/11: A Turning Point for Putin.”
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acts in Russia allegedly perpetrated by Chechen and Ingush rebels, such as the apartment
bombings in Moscow, Dagestan and Volgodonsk that left hundreds dead.4
Putin had been waging a “war on terrorism” inside the borders of Russia long before
Bush coined the phrase to garner support for America’s decision to use military force in
Afghanistan. The U.S. objective behind the decision to enter Afghanistan was to capture those
behind the 9/11 plot and to dismantle the Islamic extremist group, al Qaeda.5 As one writer put it
“Internationally, the need to maintain the US-led coalition against Islamic fundamentalism
persuaded foreign leaders to downplay other crucial elements in the complex and multi-layered
confrontation.”6 In his desire to link the Russian fight against terrorism with the United States
War on Terror, Putin pointed to the issue of radical Islam, highlighting the religious aspects of
the conflict, as well as the international aspects of global terrorism reaching into the Caucasus.
Christopher Marsh, a expert on Russian-Chechen relations with the U.S. Army School of
Advanced Military studies writes about that conflict that "Which started as a nationalist
independence movement, evolved into a ‘jihad,'" and that "religion was a factor from the start,
but that it increased dramatically once radical elements within the movement sought assistance

4

Preeti Bhattacharji, “Chechen Terrorism,” The Council of Foreign Relations, April 8, 2010,
http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/chechen-terrorism-russia-chechnya-separatist/p9181 (accessed April 9, 2012). There is
still a great deal of controversy about the apartment bombings, no evidence has conclusively linked them to the Chechen
Separatists despite the fact the Russian government placed the blame squarely upon them. There are still a great number of
unanswered questions with some political analysists speculating that then President Yeltsin or perhaps even Vladimir Putin may
have been involved in an attempt to garner support for military actions in Chechnya. Also at that time Putin was still heavily
involved with the Oligarchs and their involvement would not be inconceivable. Nothing has been decisively proven either way.
Another source on the apartment bombings is Matthew Evangelista's The Chechen Wars where on page 64 he mentions the
popularity of the Second Chechen War due to the series of terrorist bombings on Russian territory which, conveniently coincided
with the defeat of the Chechens in Dagestan. Suspicions fell on the Chechens although nothing was ever proven.
5
Philip Mud, "Rethinking Objectives in Afghanistan," Foreign Policy.com, November 17, 2010,
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/17/rethinking_objectives_in_afghanistan (accessed February 16, 2013). The article states the
reason behind Bush's decision to invade Afghanistan as "The United States entered Afghanistan to resolve this threat, to hunt
those who had orchestrated the 9/11 murders, and to disrupt, then dismantle, the network that would organize future plots. The
Bonn diplomatic process that resulted in the creation of Hamid Karzai's government in Kabul supported this goal of uprooting
and eviscerating al Qaeda. We would help Afghanistan choose legitimate, competent leaders who would not allow terrorist safe
havens on Afghan soil."
6
John Russell, “A War by Any Other Name: Chechnya, 11 September and the War Against Terrorism,” Chechnya: From Past to
Future, ed., Richard Sakwa (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 239.
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from abroad, bringing international mujahideen fighters into the conflict."7 Radical Islam was
growing in the Caucasus and the situation in Chechnya was out of control, prompting one author
to write: "...an independent Chechnya...would pose a permanent security threat to Russia's
southern marches and for all of its neighboring states."8 If radical Islam and terrorist elements
were considered to be national security issues, Putin felt he had little choice but to take action.
Putin, in his autobiography writes about the situation, "They built up their forces and attacked a
neighboring territory. Why? In order to defend the independence of Chechnya? Of course not.
In order to seize additional territories. They would have swallowed up Dagestan and that would
have been the beginning of the end."9
The decision to move the Russian military into Chechnya and prevent the possibility of
the "Yugoslavisation" of the Russian Federation is a political study and does not examine the
various accusations of human rights abuses that have incurred during the course of the conflict
on either side. Russian soldiers, journalists, human rights workers, and Chechens – military and
civilian – have noted multiple human rights abuses during the Second Chechen War. The urban
conflict aspects have been particularly brutal and bloody. But what occurs during a conflict is
not the determiner of the decisions made pre-conflict and should not be used to make a
retrospective argument.10 Putin decided to keep Chechnya inside the traditional Russian borders
of the Federation and pursued this decision to completion through the use of military force. In
order to garner international support for what would prove to be an extended and brutal
7

Christopher Marsh, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, "The Desecularization of the Chechen War," written for
Religion, State and Society Journal (personal correspondence with author)
8
Sakwa, introduction to Chechnya: From Past to Future, 14-15.
9
Vladmir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin (New York:
PublicAffairs, 2000), 142.
10
This thesis relies on sources not intimately involved with the war, such as first person accounts from Grozny and the writings
of Anna Politkovskaya for a reason. This thesis examines the legality and legitimacy of Putin's decision to not grant Chechnya
their independence and not what occurred during the actual conflict after the decision to use military force was made. The
emotion of first person accounts adds a great deal to the narrative of the conflict, but not to the decision on whether the Russian
Military should have been utilized to keep Chechnya within the bounds of the Federation.

3

campaign Putin used the American "War on Terror" and the animosity toward Al Qaeda and the
Taliban to bolster his own case against the Islamic separatist in Russia's troubled Caucasus
region. Putin's decisions regarding any particular use of force or war policy, or the accusations
that he, the Russian government, or any particular military officers should be viewed as war
criminals for incidents that occurred during the conflict remains a separate study.11 The original
issues which formed the basis of the decision to employ force to dismantle the separatist
movement, protect the borders of other semi-autonomous areas of the Federation, and relieve
Russia's fears of a potential Yugaslavisation of the Federation remain the same despite the
questionable actions made after that force was deployed.

11

Determining the end date of the Second Chechen War was very difficult. Some scholars put the date as early as 2000, others
say 2003 when Akhmed Kadyrov took over as President of the region beginning the Chechnization of the war, others put 2006
when peace accords were signed. The BBC Timeline of the conflict (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18188085) states
that Russia declared the "situation in Chechnya normalized" in 2009. For the purpose of this thesis the 2009 date has been
chosen as the end of the conflict, because a conflict cannot be truly considered over until life in the war-torn region begins to
resume a sense of normalcy.

4

12

Figure 1: A map showing the various autonomous regions inside the Russian Federation
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“Autonomous Areas in Russia” [map]. http://boes.org/child/russia/images/mapruaut96.jpg (accessed February 12, 2012).
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“Russia” [map]. BBC News Online country profile.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/languages/european_languages/countries/russia.shtml (accessed May 21, 2013).
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Figure 2: A current map of Russian showing the location of Grozny in proximity to the
remainder of the Federation.
History

The problems in Chechnya did not suddenly arise with the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the Second Chechen War in 1999 did not occur because of any single incident. The tensions
that existed between Russia and her annexed Caucasus regions were centuries old.14 Initial
Russian interest in Chechnya dated to the reign of Ivan the Terrible. After his successful
conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan in 1552 and 1556 respectively, he married a Kabartay princess
and "justified his claim to sovereignty over Kabarda and the entire Northern Caucasus – a
justification to which all his successors, including the Romanovs and Bolsheviks, were to
cling."15 Claim to sovereignty and physical possession are not the same thing, however, and in
1732 Peter the Great attempted to conquer Chechnya, but failed. He did, however, secure the
land right up to the border and Chechnya became a neighbor of the Tsars. By the mid-eighteenth
century, Tsarist Russia occupied most of the border area. 16 But occupation did not bring peace.
A writer for Deutsche Welle, explains: “When Chechnya’s southern neighbor, Christian Georgia,
agreed to a union with Moscow in 1783, the Muslim north Caucasus was encircled and a holy
war ensued.” 17

14

“Chechnya and Russia: A History of Conflict.” Deutsche Welle, http://www.dw.de/chechnya-and-russia-ahistory-of-conflict/a-660987 (accessed March 10, 2012).
15
Moshe Gammer, The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 9.
16
Lee Banville, “Conflict in Chechnya: Russia’s Renegade Republic,” PBS.Org. Online Newshour,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/chechnya/history.html (accessed March 20, 2012).
17
“Chechnya and Russia: A History of Conflict,” Deutsches Welle, while technically this would seem to be the first
Chechen War it is not commonly referred to as such.

6

In 1785 Sheikh Mansur, a Chechen Iman, began to persuade the Sufi Chechens into
"returning to true Islam" to live only according to Shari'a law and to foment a jihad against the
infidel rule – particularly the Russians. In 1785 the Russians decided to take Mansur alive,
which led to a major conflict between the Chechens and Russians. In September, 1785, after
severe fighting, Mansur retreated into the mountains, temporarily abandoning the idea of
attacking Russia strongholds, but this only lasted until November of the same year when the
skirmishes resumed. However, fighting the Russians was not his only concern; he actively
sought to spread Shari'a law throughout the region, by sword if necessary, worked to convert the
Ingush and Dagestanis. During Catherine the Great's Russian-Ottoman war (1787-1791) Mansur
co-operated with the Turks and convinced the Chechens to join in harassing the Russians. The
Russians captured Mansur in 1791who perished from consumption while in captivity in the
Shlisselburg fortress. Mansur became a national hero to the Chechens considered "one of their
own who...was the first to preach and lead the struggle against the Russians in the Caucasus."18
Under Tsar Alexander I, annexation was considered a first step in the further exploration
of the Caucasus. After the Napoleonic Wars came to a close Russia had the time and resources
to devote to the conquest of the southern mountains. In 1818 the Russians established the
fortress of Groznaia and a town grew around the fort – Goznyi, a city that was destined to
become the capital of Chechnya under the Soviets. It wasn't until 1840, however, that the
Russians attempted to establish direct rule in Chechnya. Chechen hope for independence rose
again during the Crimean War, 1853-1856, but when the French, English, and Ottomans failed to
inflict a decisive strategic defeat on Russia the Chechens lost morale and considered
surrendering their sovereignty. By 1857 Russia gained control over the plains of Greater

18

Gammer, The Lone Wolf and the Bear, 17-29, 34-35. 102-103.
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Chechnya and by 1859 Chechnya fell under Russian rule. Chechnya was now a part of the
Russian empire and under the rule of the Tsars.19
Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910) spent some of his formative years in Chechnya, serving in the
Tsarist Army in the Caucasus and because of his great sympathy for the Chechens and their
cause, a sympathy that grew from witnessing the cruel repression of the Chechen people and
devastation of their homeland by the Russians, is even now considered Chechnya’s favorite
Russian.20 He based three of his books in the Caucasus region, including The Cossacks and
Hadji Murad. Tolstoy's words proved eerily prophetic, they took on an even deeper meaning
with the new Russian-Chechen military actions in 1994 and again in 1999. He warned in 1850
of the danger in trying to subdue the Chechens by Russian military force, believing the restive
population would never be completely conquered. Even as an outside observer Tolstoy realized
the deep hatred Chechens held for the Russians that occupied their lands and lorded over them.
He wrote in his book Hadji Murad:
It was not hatred, for they did not regard those Russian dogs as human beings; but
it was such repulsion, disgust and perplexity at the senseless cruelty of these
creatures, that the desire to exterminate them — like the desire to exterminate rats,
poisonous spiders, or wolves — was as natural an instinct as that of selfpreservation.21

In 1860 the Russians separated Chechnya and Dagestan into distinct districts, a
separation that endured under both the Tsars and the Soviets. While there were several revolts
throughout the Caucasus region the new Russian territories would remain fully under the Tsars’
control. The Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878 ignited a flame in both Chechnya and Dagestan,
but despite a revolt by the people in the Caucasus, they were unable to break free from the
19

Ibid, 17-29, 34-35, 102-103.
Banville, “Conflict in Chechnya: Russia’s Renegade Republic.”
21
Sophia Kishkovsky, “Chechnya’s Favorite Russian: Leo Tolstoy,” The New York Times, December 28, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/29/arts/29iht-tolstoy.html?_r=1 (accessed March 10, 2012).

20

8

Russian empire and instead faced punishment, up to and including exile. Once allowed to return,
those exiled to the Russian interior returned to the Caucasus but the thousands who fled to the
Ottoman Empire never returned.22
In the mid-1880s oil was discovered in Chechnya which has played a major role in its
fate ever since. Grozny oil was particularly desirable as it was "rich in petrol and need[ed] little
refining."23 But despite the empire's newfound wealth, the time of the Tsars was nearing an end.
In March 1917 the Russian Revolution began and the effects would reach well into Chechnya
and the surrounding Caucasus regions. Islamic leaders were most interested in securing Shari'a
law over the mountains. After securing power during the October Revolution in late1917 "the
new regime [the Bolsheviks] issued a 'Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia' in
which it recognized their right to self-determination and to secession."24 Chechens (and Ingush)
were deeply divided into the "secularists" and the "Islamists," causing many of the Caucasus
people to join the Bolsheviks. It was indeed a combination effort of Chechens and Bolsheviks
who joined forces against the Cossacks that saved the Soviet cause in the Caucasus region. By
1924, the new communist regime, were firmly in control of Chechnya.25 Regarding the
transition from Tsarist Russia to what would become the USSR, Anup Shah writes: “After the
1917 Russian Revolution, a declaration of independence by the Chechens was met with
occupation from the Bolsheviks who later established the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Region
in 1924.”26
By the middle of the 1920s the Soviets were confident of their hold on the North
Caucasus and began their attempt at restructuring the socio-economic and political landscape of
22

Gammer, The Lone Wolf and the Bear, 84-86, 101-103.
Gammer, 105-106.
24
Ibid, 122.
25
Ibid, 128-130.
26
Anup Shah, “Crisis in Chechnya,” Global Issues, September 4, 2004,
http://www.globalissues.org/article/100/crisis-in-chechnya (accessed April 3, 2012).
23

9

the area. They disarmed the citizens of the region and weakened the clergy's hold on the area. In
1926 the Soviet abolished the Shari'a courts and muftiates and "scripts based on the Latin
alphabet [which were in turn replaced by the Cyrillic script] were imposed on the languages of
the region, breaking the links created by the common use of Arabic. State schools were promoted
in an effort to draw children away from religious Arabic-language ones."27 By 1928 the attack
against religious leaders was entrenched and occurred alongside a collectivization of agriculture.
By the 1930s Soviet authorities were destroying mosques in the region as well as Islamic
colleges and elementary schools.28 Yet, while religious identity was being destroyed, obstinately
"the Soviet Union was the first state in history to be formed of political unites based on
nationality."29 It was meant to be a union of republics yet those republics were able to maintain
little if any political sovereignty. There was no attempt to "homogenize" ethnicities and in fact,
one could not choose "Soviet" as a nationality for their passport.30 But with Islam under fire this
would mean little in the Caucasus and the Chechen hope for independence when the Communists
first rose to power, was not to be.
The advent of World War II (or in the Russian terminology, "The Great Patriotic War")
brought about a reversal of these policies. Once the Germans began moving into Russian
territory there was a great fear in Moscow that the mostly Islamic regions might shift their
loyalty to the Germans due to the Soviet Union’s oppressive stance on their religious practices.
Melvin writes: "With the advance of the German forces, the Soviet authorities began to fear that
some Muslim communities in the Soviet Union might shift their loyalties. In response, the
authorities recanted their earlier policy and officially recognized Islam, although within a tightly
27

Gammer, The Lone Wolf and The Bear, 146.
Ibid, 146-148.
29
Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, Oxford University
Press, 2011, 312-313.
28

30

Ibid,
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controlled framework." 31 This, however, proved to be a case of “too little, too late.” The
Germans were willing to go far further than the U.S.S.R. to accommodate the Islamic
communities by closing the hated collective farms and even establishing mosques, a significant
act after the Soviet authorities had so many mosques destroyed in the Caucasus region only a
decade before. There is conflicting evidence whether or not the people of the border regions in
the Caucasus collaborated with the invading Nazi Army.32 Stalin could not prove that the people
of the Caucasus aided the enemy but he was highly suspicious of the people in this border region
and their relationship to the Germans and so implemented a brutal policy of deportation. As Neil
Melvin in his paper for the Stockholm International Peace Institute recounts:

The government of Josef Stalin had entire ethnic groups—including the Balkar,
Chechens, Ingush and Karachai of the North Caucasus— rounded up, loaded into cattle
wagons, and transported to Central Asia and Siberia. Thousands died. The forced
relocations were carried out quickly, on the pretext of mostly unfounded accusations of
collaboration with the Nazis. The former republics of the exiled peoples were dissolved
and the territory was given to other republics or groups. Their homes were taken over by
new inhabitants or left to decay.33`
Most were exiled to Kazakhstan, and almost one third of them died on the long trek into
unfamiliar and unforgiving lands.34 It would take the death of Stalin and the ascension of Nikita
Khrushchev before the exiled Chechens would be allowed to return to their homelands. In 195758 50,000 of the exiled people of the Caucasus returned home only to find other people,
predominantly ethnic Russians, living on their land, often even occupying their houses. This

31

Neil J. Melvin, “Building Stability in the North Caucasus: Ways forward for Russia and the European Union,”
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, May, 2007, http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP16.pdf
(accessed March 13, 2012).
32
Shah, “Crisis in Chechnya.”
33 Melvin, “Building Stability in the North Caucasus.”
34 “Chechnya and Russia: A History of Conflict.”
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created a tension that still exists and cannot be overlooked as a factor in the recent RussianChechen conflicts.35

In 1991, seizing the opportunity of a rapidly disintegrating USSR, the Chechens declared
their independence from the long resented Russians, an action that would culminate in the 1994
First Chechen War under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin.36 So many of the former U.S.S.R.s and
S.S.R's were breaking free from Moscow and Chechnya wanted to be a part of that movement.
However, Chechnya, a semi-autonomous region rather than a satellite, was not given that option.
As Chechnya's president, Johar Dudayev, became more outspoken in his criticism of the Kremlin
as well as in his insistence on independence, Yeltsin's patience was exhausted and he sent in the
military. What Yeltsin promised would a quick victory was not, the Russian soldiers were met
with fierce opposition and the conflict lasted three years before coming to an end with a peace
agreement that left the issue of independence unresolved. With such an unsatisfactory
conclusion the Second Chechen War, which flared up within three years of the uneasy peace
agreement, was no surprise. What had changed in the intermission was the focus of the conflict,
where the First Chechen War was based on independence and politics, the Second Chechen War
had a religious focus absent from the first conflict.37 There were tones of jihad and breaking free
from the "infidels" that was not a primary issue three years previous. The goals of Chechen
Separatists in the modern era, based upon the heavy fighting and brutal violence of both of the
Chechen Wars and the terrorist activities outside of the Caucasus, have changed little since the
time of Tolstoy, both in religious and political ways. From Tsarist Russia to the Soviet Union to

35

Melvin, “Building Stability in the North Caucasus.”
Tracey C. German, Russia’s Chechen War (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 114-116.
37
Lawrence Scott Sheets, Eight Pieces of Empire: A Twenty Year Journey Through the Soviet Collapse (New York:
Crown Publishing Group, 2011), 180-181.

36
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the Russian Federation of today, Chechnya has been an uneasy and unwilling part of the empire,
with tensions sometimes building, sometimes simply smoldering, but never completely diffusing.

Chechens are ethnically, linguistically, and religiously different from Russians. For
decades they viewed themselves as subjugated by conquerors, not brought into an empire as
equal members. But when the Chechens declared independence, pointing out Yeltsin’s
willingness to let the various republics and satellites separate from Russia and become their own
independent nations – citing Estonia and Moldova – they overlooked a crucial factor. The
regions used as examples were either satellite states or S.S.R.s, something that did not apply to
the Caucasus region far as Moscow was concerned. According to Moscow the region
historically belonged to Russia and was inside the territorial borders of old Russia.38 The
Caucasus regions, including Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, have also never been
designated as Soviet Socialist Republics (S.S.R.) such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
Chechnya was considered a semi-autonomous region, not an S.S.R. (a semi-independent
republic), and therefore its move for separation was not considered as a bid for independence but
one of secession. With Russia in turmoil due to the collapse of communism and the economy in
tatters, Yeltsin was not wrong in his fear that a secession of Caucasus areas had the potential to
cause the splintering of his country, the “Yugoslavisation” as Putin would later term such a
breakdown, along religious or ethnic boundaries. That is why areas such as Chechnya, Dagestan,
and Ingushetia could not simply be granted their right to be sovereign, autonomous states. They
were positioned inside Russia’s pre-WWI borders and not designated as satellite states but as
part of Russia. Moscow viewed declarations of sovereignty from these regions as secession.39
Secession could not be tolerated and so sparked the first and second Chechen wars. Before those
38

39

Bhattacharji, “Chechen Terrorism.”
Shah, “Crisis in Chechnya.”
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wars ended the human cost of the conflict, for both the Russians and Chechens, would be
enormous.
Putin and Chechnya
Even before 9/11 many Western powers admitted that with the legacy of lawlessness left
by the failure of the first Chechen War, Russia had little choice but to use military force in the
area.40 No international humanitarian groups would stay in Chechnya after a particularly brutal
incident in December of 1996. Someone murdered six of fifteen Red Cross workers in Novye
Atagi, Chechnya, while they slept. The Red Cross immediately withdrew all other workers from
the region.41 Dianne Leigh Sumner in "Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya"
writes: "Hundreds of people have been kidnapped in Chechnya since the end of the war to
include foreign aid workers and journalists for whom the captors have netted 'an estimated 20
million.'"42
An incident in May of 1998 revealed that Kremlin officials were not exempt from the
violence sweeping the area as Valentin Vlasov, Yetsin's special envoy to Chechnya, was
kidnapped while visiting Chechnya on official business and held for six months before being
released. Ironically, Vlasov was in the breakaway Republic "on a mission to negotiate a
crackdown on kidnappings in the region."43 He was also one of the officials who helped draft
the peace agreement that ended the first Chechen War.44 The official stance of the Chechen

40

Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (New York: Rowan
and Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 128.
41
Dianne Leigh Sumner, “Success of Terrorism in War: The Case For Chechnya,” in Chechnya Revisited, ed. Yu.
K. Nikolaev (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2003), 113.
42
Ibid, 113-114.
43
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government was that the kidnapping was political, not mercenary, and designed to increase the
tensions between Russia and the already unstable Caucasus region. This act further strained the
relationship between Chechnya and the Russian Federation. Another act of violence later that
same year would alienate Chechnya from the Western world – the kidnapping and murder of
four Western engineers. Three British and one New Zealand engineers were in Chechnya
installing a mobile telephone system despite warnings against travel in the Caucasus region.
Taken by Chechen rebels from their home, which was situated only a few hundred yards from a
special anti-hostage task force, the four men were beaten, starved and beheaded, their heads
found in a bag on the side of a road in Chechnya that October.45 While Chechen President Aslan
Maskhadov attempted to blame the deaths on the Russians, telling reporters that the murders had
been committed only to discredit Chechnya, such conspiracy theories were not considered
credible. A wealthy Russian financier who negotiated the release of several hostages, including
two British Christian aid workers earlier that same year, pointed the blame for the crime on "wild
gangs...impossible to control."46 One thing was certain – the situation in Chechnya was boiling
over and something had to be done soon. The burden of action fell upon Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin, and he was willing to take drastic measures to bring the area back under Russian
control.
The final spark to the already smoldering tensions occurred in August and September of
1999 when hundreds of armed Chechen rebels invaded Dagestan with the intent of creating an
independent Islamic state.47 The invasion of Dagestan was exactly the situation Putin needed to
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justify sending in the Russian military. In the interest of maintaining peace and order in the
Caucasus region, the rebels, now spreading into the surrounding areas, had to first be contained
and then neutralized. Putin did not accept an independent and completely autonomous
Chechnya, and he certainly did not agree to Chechnya trying to annex surrounding areas such as
parts of Dagestan and Ingushetia.
In August of 1999, Chechen Rebels invaded parts of neighboring Dagestan and also set
off two bombs in Moscow apartment buildings. According to author Ronald Griger Suny, "In
the midst of the crisis, Yeltsin announced Putin ad the new prime minister. A month later
explosions tore apart several apartment buildings in Moscow and two towns in the south killing
hundreds. As panic gripped the population the former KGB operative immediately demonstrated
he was tough and decisive."48 Andrei P. Tsygankov writes: “The sheer magnitude of violence
was unprecedented, Russians united behind Putin, who was running for president on the
platform of “eradiating extremism” in Chechnya and reestablishing a “strong state” throughout
the entire Russian territory.”49 At the beginning of his campaign, Putin’s popularity was at 2%,
leaping to 58% the following January at the height of the Chechen war. Suny refers to Putin as
"reaping a bonanza of popular support."50 Instead of costing Putin his political career the war
solidified his political capital and gave it a weight and a legitimacy it may have otherwise lacked.
His decisive actions and willingness to spend both money and lives to secure Russia’s borders
was both reassuring to the Russian people and fearful to those seeking independence. Unlike
Yeltsin, Putin would rule with an iron fist.
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The Chechen invasion of Dagestan occurred with the help of some Dagestani rebels but
without any act of compliance or encouragement from the Dagestani government.51 Reports on
the number of separatists who crossed the border varied from 300 to 2,000, most Chechens but
some Dagestani, with others from Central Asia and the Middle East. They were lead by known
terrorist Samil Basaev and an Arab fighter by the name of Khattab who was married to a
Dagastani woman. The government of Dagestan requested help from Moscow to expel the
unwanted invaders after their borders were breached. This was all that then-Prime Minister
Putin needed to act. Putin feared that the trouble in Chechnya would "move up the Volga and
spread to other republics and result in the Yugoslavisation of Russia." In Putin's own words he
states: "My evaluation of the situation in August (1999) when the bandits attacked Dagestan was
that if we don't stop it immediately, Russia in its current state would no longer exist."52 Russian
military forces with the welcome aid of Dagestani forces moved into the areas held by the
Separatists.53
With the invasion of Dagestan in 1999 the separatists were stating their intentions clearly:
they desired an Islamic homeland that would be governed by Shari’a law. These rebels saw
surrounding Islamic areas as part of their struggle to be free from the Russian Federation.54
Putin understood this aim as well as in an interview he stated:
The issue is not succession...Chechnya will not stop with its own independence. It will
be used as staging ground for further attack on Russia. Why? in order to protect
Chechen independence? Of course not. The purpose will be to grab more territory.
They would overwhelm Dagestan. Then the whole Caucasus- Dagestan, Ingushetia and
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then up along the Volga...55

In the article "Chechnya's Problems Spill Over into Dagestan, the writer states: "The ultimate
aim of the rebels in Chechnya is to control the entire Caucasus and claim it back from the
Russians."56
Putin was not yet president of Russia when the second Chechen conflict began in 1999,
but as Prime Minister the question of how Russia should respond to recent Separatist terrorist
actions was put before him and he did not shirk from it. While some argue that this was not
Putin’s decision to make but that of then President Boris Yeltsin, Putin himself disagrees.57 In
Putin’s autobiography he stated that the deployment of Russian troops to Chechnya was his
decision and one for which he takes full responsibility. He expected it to be the end of his career
but he was determined that Russia would not face “Yugoslavisation.” Speaking of his decision
to move into Chechnya (actually first Dagestan and then Chechnya) to crush the independence
movement, Putin states that he saw the problems in the Caucasus as a continuation of the
collapse of the USSR, but one that wasn’t stopping or resolving itself. “If we don’t put an end to
this, Russia will cease to exist,” Putin wrote, and he felt that if an end was not brought to the
troubles in the north that not only the Caucasus but all of Russia would face “a second
Yugoslavia.”58
Putin was determined that Russia would not be divided or split along ethnic or religious
lines and the Russian nation would be kept intact at any cost – a cost that the Russian soldiers
deployed to the Caucasus along with those living in Chechnya, particularly those in Grozny,
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would soon pay. And Putin was also willing to pay a personal cost. He went on to say, “It was a
question of preventing the collapse of the country. I realized I could only do this at the cost of
my political career. It was a minimal cost, and I was prepared to pay up.”59 The result would be
quite different, however. Authors Roland Dannreuther and Luke March, in an article for The
Institute of Governance, wrote:
In 1996, in order to ensure his electoral victory, Boris Yeltsin was all but forced to
negotiate a humiliating agreement with Chechen rebel leaders granting them de facto
independence. In 1999–2000, the strategic dangers of Islamist extremism and
expansionism emanating from a lawless Chechnya were central to Vladimir Putin’s
presidential campaign. Moscow’s subsequent robust military response conferred the
mantle of legitimacy on Putin, who had been almost invisible politically a few months
earlier.”60

In Moscow, however, Yeltsin's health was failing and there were talks of a successor.
Russia was surprised when he chose the virtually unknown Putin. Upon gaining the presidency
in May, 2000 Putin quickly set about correcting what he perceived were mistakes made by
Yeltsin regarding Chechnya. Now with presidential powers and the political clout that came
with them, Putin vowed to hold the Russian Federation together and launched what would
become known as the Second Chechen War. The war gained wide support from the Russian
people but was also condemned by human rights groups throughout the world.
The conflict became increasingly drawn out with little progress made with seemingly no
end in sight and in this light the events of 9/11 was a substantial boon to Putin’s cause, restoring
legitimacy to his “fight against terrorism” and “fight against Islamic extremists.” There were
strong implications that arms in Chechnya, used during both terrorist attacks and in the Second
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Chechen War may have been supplied by Osama Bin Laden, giving some credence to Putin's
affiliation with Bush’s stance on terrorism after 9/11.61 When Putin spoke on the phone to
George W. Bush after the 9/11 attacks, he was establishing himself as a compatriot in the global
war on terrorism with the West. In the chess game of power, sovereignty and world opinion,
Putin had gained an upper hand in the conflict that continued to rage in the Caucasus.
Putin stated this is action was counter-terrorism activity, but the press generally labeled
this new conflict the Second Chechen War. Putin justified his actions due to recent bombings
across Russia allegedly committed by Chechen separatists.62 As noted earlier, this conflict had
wide support from the Russian people, an aspect vastly different from what President Boris
Yeltsin faced in the First Chechen War. Perhaps the difference was in the terminology and the
reasoning behind it. Yeltsin sent in troops to prevent Chechnya from becoming a breakaway
republic, attempting to stop the loss of territory brought about by the collapse of the Soviet
Union. It was his proverbial “line in the sand," a statement that the disintegration and
fragmentation of the nation had to stop at the centuries-old Russian border in the Caucasus.
While Putin may have been in control of the decision making regarding Chechnya he did
not attempt to micromanage the Russian military or their actions in the region. The General
Staff of the Army, particularly Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, was given a “carte
blanche” to achieve victory by its own means.63 After the humiliating defeat of the Russian
Army in the first Chechen War, a war that cost thousands of lives and millions of dollars and
played a significant role in the 1998 collapse of the economy, these Generals were determined to
make a strong statement in their return to Chechnya. They proceeded slowly, using heavy
61
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artillery fire – always a favorite Russian tactic from the Napoleonic Wars to World War II64 – to
clear the path of resistance along the way to Grozny. Putin, placing the fate of Chechnya in the
hands of the military, assured the generals that he was prepared for a hard won triumph.65 In
1999 there was no way they could have known how hard the triumph would be and the cost that
both Russians and Chechens would be forced to pay. Russia would pay a heavy cost
economically as well as in both casualties and international reputation.
The Second Chechen Conflict was underway, with glaring differences between the
current conflict and the First Chechen War in that the war was no longer secular but had taken on
a radical Islamic tone by the separatists.66 Radicalization had taken hold of the area, and the
moderate Chechen leader, Alsan Maskhadov, was no longer able to maintain control.67 Although
he was only the Prime Minister and not yet the President, Putin was no Yeltsin, and he was
willing to take responsibility and control, and this time he had the support of the Russian people.
He would not be content to end this conflict leaving issues such as independence unresolved.
Lena Johnson, senior research fellow at the Swedish Institute for International Affairs wrote:
"What in August 1999 was presented as an operation to deter Chechen aggression against
Dagestan; had in October become an effort to seal rebellious Chechnya off along the river Terek;
in November to “eliminate the terrorists, and finally in January 2000 a military operation in
defense of Russian territorial integrity.”68 There was clearly three objectives in Putin's decision
to use military force, to contain Chechnya within her borders, to eliminate the terrorist threat, and
to preserve the borders of the Russian Federation. Putin’s aim was to destroy the Separatist
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movement and to bring the troubled region back firmly under Moscow's control. There would be
no open ended Khasavyurt Agreement this time around.69 It was time to solve the Chechnya
problem and put an end to the terrorism stemming from Chechnya.
By the time that Putin took office as the President of the Russia Federation in 2000 most
of the major military offensives in Chechnya were behind him, at least on paper if not in
practice, but the worst of the terrorist actions were still to come. In October of 2002, in a theater
in Moscow, at a performance of a popular play, “Nord Ost,” Chechen rebels who identified
themselves as militant Islamists Separatists, took over the theater holding everyone inside
hostage. The rebels held over 850 people hostage demanding an end to the Second Chechen War
and a withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya. The standoff lasted for approximately two
and half days until the Russian military, in a heavily criticized move, responded by pumping an
unknown gas into the theater to subdue the hostage takers. By the time the theater was cleared,
129 of the hostages and 39 of the attackers were dead or dying.70 It seemed that perhaps the real
Chechen problem was only beginning. If Putin hoped, when he called Bush to offer condolences
on the American 9/11 that the terrorist attacks on Russian were past rather than still in the future,
he was wrong.
The worst terrorist act was still to come, it would strike in a small town in the South of
Russia, one with a mixed Christian and Islamic population. The next terrorist attack revealed to
the world what the Separatists were truly capable of accomplishing. On September 1, 2004 it
was the first day of school, the “Day of Knowledge,” for the residents of Beslan, a small town of
approximately 37,000 located in the Republic of North Ossetia. Shortly after the school’s
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opening festivities Islamic Separatists seized the school. The attackers – some Chechen, some
from the different Caucasus Republics – were under the leadership of Shamil Basayev, Russia's
most wanted terrorist. The terrorists demanded an end to the Russian military presence in
Chechnya. The terrorists herded the entire population of the school, including many parents and
young children who had come to see their older brothers and sisters participate in the festivities,
into the school gymnasium. They were kept there for three days in sweltering heat with no food
or water. Finally the Russian military, in an effort to free the hostages after the breakdown of
negotiations, stormed the building. Unfortunately, the terrorists had anticipated the Russian
move and rigged the building with explosives. All but one terrorist was killed as were 334 of the
hostages, 186 of them children.
The orchestrator of both the "Nord Ost" and the Beslan terrorist actions was “Russia's
most wanted man, Shamil Salmanovich Basayev...a leading Chechen field commander behind
some of the most violent and high-profile attacks in the war for Chechen independence,” writes
Elizabeth Smick for the Council of Foreign Relations.71 One of his commanders was reported as
stating: “The Caucasus area does not belong to Russia, it belongs to its Muslim people from the
Black to the Caspian sea. The area was savagely suppressed and occupied by criminal Russia
about 150 years ago, now is the time for every Muslim to share the reward of freeing the land of
the free, Caucasia,"72 It was not enough for Basayev to achieve the goal of an independent
Chechnya, he and his followers were determined to create an Islamic homeland as evidenced by
their invasion of Dagestan, an area that had not invited them in or shown interest as a political
entity of joining the Chechen struggle. Emil Pain, Director of the Center for Ethno-Political
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Studies in Moscow, writes that: “It remains a mystery how the Basayev detachment of 2,000
men thought it could take Dagestan or even any of its regions when it would have to face the
entire Russian military.”73
The Chechen incursion into Dagestan shows that “that the Chechen rebels are simply
advancing toward their goal of 'reclaiming' the entire Caucasian region in order to achieve their
goal of Islamicising the area.”74 However, Dagestan’s government has shown little inclination to
be “Islamicised.” Dagestan, though struggling with corruption, achieved some semblance of
stability. Though it contains far more ethnic nationalities than Chechnya it has a lengthy history
of being relatively peaceful based predominantly on its traditional tribal system, a system quite
different from that of its troubled neighbor.75 Dagestan did not suffer the same fate as the
Chechens who were displaced by Stalin in such large numbers during World War II, perhaps this
is one reason for a more amicable relationship with Moscow.76 Despite their shared religion,
Dagestan did not share either Chechnya’s turmoil or ambitions for full independence. Their
close proximity, however, meant that Chechnya’s internal troubles spread across the border into
Dagestan. Angelique van Engelen writing for The Global Politician goes on to say:
The perpetrators of the violence are mostly Islamic guerrillas and the mafia that have
crossed the border from Chechnya as well as members of ethnic minorities from
Dagestan that are joining in the battle. Among the professed reasons for their violence are
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the republic's corruption and abuse. The ultimate aim of the rebels in Chechnya is to
control the entire Caucasus and claim it back from the Russians.77
Author Moshe Gammer, in the last chapter of his book The Lone Wolf and the Bear writes that
more and more the conflict from the viewpoint of the Chechens was becoming less about
nationality and more about Islam. He quotes from journalist Jeremy Bransten, “Here in the
mountains, to an increasing extend the atmosphere is becoming influenced by radical doctrine.”
He explains that when he asks young rebel soldiers why they are fighting, many times the answer
is no longer ‘independence’ but instead is ‘We want the word of the prophet and the word of God
to be the main arbiter in Chechnya. Today Allah requires us to establish Shari’a law.’”78 In
other words, the reason is radical Islam with the establishment of a theocracy in the Caucasus. A
regime the Chechens have proved by their past actions that they would not be content to have
only inside their own borders, but a theocracy that would extend across their Islamic neighbor’s
borders as well. Putin’s desire for a solution to the conflict in Chechnya required that he find an
“inside man” who was Muslim, Chechen, and yet supported his policies toward Chechnya. The
“Chechenization” of the conflict centered on the Kadyrovs.

Making a Deal with the Devil: Ramzan Kadyrov

It was through the Kadyrov's, first Akhmed and then after his assassination, his son
Ramzan, that Putin would find a way to withdraw the Russian Military from Chechnya. As the
war dragged on, and the casualty list grew, the war's public support waned. It was time for the
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Chechenization of the conflict, and to diminish direct Russian intervention. The way Putin chose
to achieve this goal was to chose a leader of Chechnya that was friendly to the Kremlin, that
proved to be under Moscow's control but was both a Muslim and an ethic Chechen. What began
with Akhmed would continue with his son.
In February, 2007 Ramzan Kadyrov at the young age of thirty took the Presidency of
Chechnya with Putin’s blessing.79 Buildings in Grozny are papered with his picture and his men,
known as “kadyrovtsy”80 dressed in combat fatigue pants and black t-shirts, roam the streets.
Kadyrov’s word is law and those who do not obey that law often end up missing. He is said to
be both the destroyer of lives and the savior of Chechnya. He is a man who started out fighting
alongside his father as a rebel resisting the Russians – he claims to have led his first militia at the
tender age of fourteen or fifteen. Kadyrov followed his father’s lead switching his alliance to the
Kremlin and against the separatists. 81 This change in allegiance by the Kadyrovs was a curious
thing and one that, at times, made the Kremlin nervous.82 A man who switched sides once can
do it again and since 2009 Kadyrov has become more demanding of Russian money and also
quick to point a finger at the Russian military instead of “rebels” for the destruction of Grozny. 83
Where his allegiance lies may be up for debate but it is unquestionable that he rules through a
mixture of fear and cult of personality. He is called the Warrior-King of Chechnya is some

79

Gammer, 217.
“Ramzan Kadyrov,” The Moscow Times,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mt_profile/ramzan_kadyrov/433775.html (accessed April 10, 2012)
81
Megan K. Stack, “Chechen Tiger Without a Chain,” Los Angeles Times, June 17, 2008,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-kadyrov17-2008jun17,0,1103942.story?page=1 (accessed
March 3, 2012).
82
Andrew Osborne, “Ramzan Kadyrov: The Warrior King of Chechnya,” The Independent, January 4, 2007,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/ramzan-kadyrov-the-warrior-king-of-chechnya-430738.html
(accessed February 22, 2012).
83
Ibid.
80

26

circles; in others he is called a war criminal and a monster, and refers to himself as the Che of
Chechnya.84
His personal office is representative of the relationship that Kadyrov desires between
Grozny and Moscow. It is adorned with the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic flags as
well as photos of Che Guevara, Vladimir Putin, and his father, Akhmed Kadyrov.85 Akhmed, the
rebel and later the best Chechen friend of the Kremlin, represented everything his son wants to
be – Chechen, Muslim, and powerful. Power comes from Putin. In fact, his respect for Putin is
so great that when he (Ramzan) was elected to a second term he declined the title “President” of
Chechnya as he was before, choosing instead to be referred to as “Head of Chechnya.” He stated
as his reason: “A country should have only one president,” further solidifying that Chechnya is a
part of Russia and not a completely separate, autonomous region. It would seem that as the
Chechen hopes of an Islamic Homeland that would stretch across the Caucasus died, the dream
of full independence died with it.86
Despite his reputation for violence, Kadyrov has been awarded the Hero of Russia medal,
is credited with bringing some sense of calm to war-torn Grozny, and under his watch, the largest
mosque in all of Europe has risen from the ashes left by Russian bombs.87 Children are returning
to school in Grozny, with acts of terrorism under the careful and threatening eye of the
Kadyrovsky are becoming few and far between.88 Regarding terrorists and rebels Kadyrov, in
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his own words, states: “My method is simple. Those who disrupt the people’s peace must be
dealt with harshly, cruelly even.”89
This stance has put him on the watch list of many NGOs including Reporters without
Borders. Perhaps with sentiments such as “The press must be in the service of the Chechen
people’s unity,” expressed directly by Kadyrov, is for the best. Many look at him with blaming
eyes for both the death of outspoken Kremlin and Kadyrov (both Jr. and Sr.) critic and journalist
for Novaya Gazetta, Anna Politkovskaya and human rights activist Natalia Estemirova, also a
vocal detractor. He calls the allegations “bullshit” and “nonsense.”90 In Chechnya, Kadyrov is
unrivaled, his poster hangs everywhere, slogans praising him are on seemingly every building
and his grasp on the small republic seems unlikely to ease in the near future.
Kadyrov was Putin’s handpicked choice for the “Chechenisation” of the conflict and now
the young leader is in full control.91 Of course he does not rule completely alone, as a writer for
the Economist explains: “Mr. Putin's policy of “Chechenisation” has meant outsourcing most of
the violence to local militias—especially the kadyrovtsy, who on most estimates number around
7,000.”92 As long as Kadyrov and Putin can maintain their alliance more stable days are on the
horizon for Chechnya, as long as you are not one of their opponents.
Conclusion
A fundamental question is whether or not the issue of an autonomous Chechnya is one of
secession or independence. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and so many countries
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reverting to independence from the USSR, the question of what makes the Caucasus regions
different must be addressed. The answer is found in the presidency of Boris Yeltsin and why he
drew the line, as one after the other Satellite states declared their freedom, in the Caucasus in
what would become the first Chechen War. Chechnya was not a satellite state of the former
USSR looking to regain their autonomy but inside of Russia’s territorial borders. Yeltsin, and
then Putin, recognized clearly the domino effect that could occur. Russia is a vast country, with
many ethnicities, many cultures, even many languages- to let one ethnic group declare
themselves free from Moscow’s control opened the door to the others following suit- Putin’s
feared “Yugoslavization.” Also, the Chechen’s desire to expand past their own borders into
neighboring countries posed a large scale national security risk as well as threatened to
destabilize completely an already precarious area. The Islamic homeland movement was the
largest threat to Russia’s stability save one alone, the outbreak of domestic terrorism. The
Moscow apartment bombing in particular had struck at the heart of everyday Russians, so much
so that Putin secured his presidency by promising action in Chechnya, an action that Russians
hoped would bring a halt to the rash of terrorist activities that extended into the Russian
heartland. The people wanted a strong, uncompromising leader and strong, heavy handed action,
and in Vladimir Putin, they received that very man.
There can be no doubt that there were massive human rights violations committed by the
Russian Army (an Army not known for their subtlety or restraint) and there can be no doubt
there was great suffering on both sides, but in a philosophy of RealPolitik, are those the
foundations of policy making and political decisions? Putin did not act on behalf of the
individual but on behalf of Russia as a whole. He was determined to hold the country together at
any cost- and so he did. Some of his decisions were brutal, some of his reactions were callused,
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and there are those who would call him a monster because of them. However, the fact that the
Chechnya was a place where kidnapping, murder and even invasions of other republics occurred
coupled with the fear of a dissolving Russia where one republic after another sought to break
away from the Federation, may very well make President Vladmir Putin a necessary monster.
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